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Abstract
In a topological structure affected by geographical constraints on liking, the con-
nectivity is weakened by constructing local stubs with small cycles, a something
of randomness to bridge them is crucial for the robust network design. In this pa-
per, we numerically investigate the effects of adding shortcuts on the robustness in
geographical scale-free network models under a similar degree distribution to the
original one. We show that a small fraction of shortcuts is highly contribute to im-
prove the tolerance of connectivity especially for the intentional attacks on hubs.
The improvement is equivalent to the effect by fully rewirings without geographical
constraints on linking. Even in the realistic Internet topologies, these effects are
virtually examined.
Key words: Complex network; Geographical constraint; Overhead bridge; Robust
connectivity; Efficient routing
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1 Introduction
In many social, technological, and biological networks, there exist several com-
mon topological characteristics which can be emerged by simple generation
mechanisms [1,2], and a small fraction of networks crucially influences the
communication properties for the routing and the robustness of connectivity.
One of the sensational facts is the small-world (SW) phenomenon: each pair
of nodes are connected through relatively small number of hops to a huge net-
work size defined by the total number of nodes. This favorable phenomenon
has been explained by the SW model with a small fraction of random rewirings
on a one-dimensional lattice [3]. Another fact is the scale-free (SF) structure
that follows a power-law degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−γ, 2 < γ < 3, consists
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of many nodes with low degrees and a few hubs with high degrees. The hetero-
geneous networks are drastically broken into many isolated clusters, when only
a small fraction of high degree nodes are removed as the intentional attacks
[4,5]. However, the SF structure is robust against random failures [4,6], and
well balanced in the meaning of both economical and efficient communication
by small number of hops in a connected network as few links as possible [7].
On the other hands, real complex networks, such as power-grid, airline flight-
connection, and the Internet, are embedded in a metric space, and long-range
links are restricted [8,9] for economical reasons. Based on the connection prob-
ability according to a penalty of distance r between two nodes and on random
triangulation, the generation mechanisms of geographical SF networks have
been proposed in lattice-embedded scale-free (LESF) [10] and random
Apollonian (RA) [11,12] network models. Unfortunately, the vulnerability of
connectivity has been numerically found in both networks [13,14,15]. More-
over, it has been theoretically predicted [13] in a generating function approach
to more general networks with any degree distribution that a geographical con-
straint on linking decreases the tolerance to random failures, since the perco-
lation threshold is increased by the majority of small-order cycles that locally
connected with a few hops. As the smallest-order, triangular cycles tend to be
particularly constructed by a geographical constraint.
In contrast, it has been suggested that higher-order cycles connected with
many hops improve the robustness in the theoretical analysis on a one-dimensional
SW model modified by adding shortcuts between two nodes out of the con-
nected neighbors [16,17]. Similarly, the expected delivery time of any decen-
tralized search algorithm without global information is decreased on a two-
dimensional lattice whose each node has a shortcut with the connection prob-
ability proportional to the power of distance r−α, α > 0 [18]. These results
support the usefulness of shortcuts for maintaining both the robust connec-
tivity and the communication efficiency, however the network structures are
almost regular and far from the realistic SF. Recently, it has been numeri-
cally shown [15] that the robustness is improved by fully random rewirings
under a same degree distribution [19] in typical geographical network models:
Delaunay triangulation (DT) [20,21], RA, and Delaunay-like scale-free
(DLSF) networks [15]. Instead of rewirings, we expect the shortcut effect on the
improvement of robustness in such geographical SF networks. Adding short-
cuts is practically more natural rather than rewirings, because the already
constructed links are not wastefully discarded. Thus, we investigate how large
connected component still remains at a rate of removed nodes as the random
failures and the targeted attacks on hubs in the geographical SF networks
with shortcuts, comparing the original ones without shortcuts. We show that
a small quantity of geographical randomness highly contributes to maintain
both the communication efficiency and the robustness under almost invariant
degree distributions to the original ones. It is not trivial that the improvement
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of robustness is equivalent to the effect by fully random rewirings.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Sec. 2, we briefly introduce
the geographical networks based on planar triangulation and embedding in a
lattice under a given power-law degree distribution. In Sec. 3, we numerically
investigate the effects of shortcuts on the optimal paths in two measures of
distance/hop and the robustness in the geographical networks. In particular,
we show that a degree cutoff enhances the improvement of the error and attack
tolerance. Moreover, we virtually examine the effects for realistic data of the
Internet topologies. Finally, in Sec. 4 we summarize these results.
2 Geographical SF networks
2.1 Planar network models
Planar networks without crossing of links are suitable for efficient geograph-
ical routings, since we can easily find the shortest path from a set of edges
of the faces that intersect the straight line between the source and terminal.
In computer science, online routing algorithms [22] that guarantee delivery of
messages using only local information about positions of the source, terminal,
and the adjacent nodes to a current node are well-known. As a connection to
SF networks, we consider Delaunay triangulation (DT) and random Apollo-
nian (RA) network models based on planar triangulation of a polygonal region.
DT is the optimal planar triangulation in some geometric criteria [20] with
respect to the maximin angle and the minimax circumcircle of triangles on
a two-dimensional space. In addition, the ratio of the shortest path length is
bounded by a constant factor to the direct Euclidean distance between any
source and terminal [23], while RA network belongs to both SF and planar
networks [12,11], however long-range links inevitably appear near the edges
of an initial polygon. To reduce the long-range links, Delaunay-like scale-free
(DLSF) network has been proposed [15].
On the preliminaries, just like overhead highways, we add shortcuts between
randomly chosen two nodes excluding self-loops and multi-links after con-
structing the above networks. For adding shortcuts, the routing algorithm can
be extended as mentioned in Appendix 1. Note that the added shortcuts con-
tribute to create some higher-order cycles which consists of a long path and
the overhead bridge in the majority of triangular cycles. The original degree
distributions without shortcuts follow a power-law with the exponent nearly 3
in RA, log-normal in DT, and power-law with an exponential cutoff in DLSF
networks [15]. Note that the lognormal distribution has an unimodal shape as
similar to one in Erdo¨s-Renyi random networks. Thus, RA and DLSF networks
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are vulnerable because of double constraints of planarity and geographical dis-
tances on the linkings, but DT networks are not so. We have confirmed that
the degree distributions have only small deviation from the original ones at
shortcut rate up to the amount of 30% of the total links.
2.2 Lattice-embedded SF networks
Let us consider a d-dimensional lattice of size R with the periodic boundary
conditions. The LESF network model [10] combines the configuration model
[24] for any degree distribution with a geographical constraint on a lattice.
Although the homogeneous positioning of nodes differs from a realistic spacial
distribution such as in the Internet routers according to the population density
[8], it has been studied as a fundamental spacial model. Note that the spatial
distribution of nodes is restricted on the regular lattice, some links are crossed,
therefore LESF networks are not planar.
In the following simulation, we assign a degree taken from the distribution
P (k) ∼ k−3 to each node on a two-dimensional lattice of the network size
N = 32×32, where γ = 3, d = 2, and R = 32. The networks have the average
numbers M ≈ 1831 of the total links at A = 1 and M ≈ 2673 at A = 3 for
comparison. The case of A → ∞ is equivalent to the Warren-Sander-Sokolov
model [25] whose degree distribution follows a pure power-law, however a cut-
off is rather natural in real networks with something of constraints on linkings
[26]. As similar to the previously mentioned planar networks, there are little
deviation form the original power-law distributions with strong and weak cut-
offs at A = 1 and A = 3, respectively. The detailed configuration procedures
for RA, DT, DLSF, and LESF networks are summarized in Appendix 2.
3 Shortcut effects
3.1 Shortest distance and minimum hops
For the shortcut rates from 0% to 30%, we investigate four combinations of
distance/hops and two kinds of the optimal paths with respect to the shortest
distance and the minimum number (or called length) of hops: the average
distance 〈D〉 on the shortest paths, the distance 〈D′〉 on the paths of the min-
imum hops, the average number of hops 〈L〉 on these paths, and the number
of hops 〈L′〉 on the shortest paths between any two nodes in the geographical
networks. The prime denotes the cross relation to the case of no prime in
the combinations of the measures and the two kinds of paths. The distance is
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defined by a sum of link lengths on the path, and the average means a sta-
tistical ensemble over the optimal paths in the above two criteria. Note that
the shortest path and the path of the minimum hops may be distinct, these
are related to the link cost or delay and the load for transfer of a message. It
is better to shorten both the distance and the number of hops, however the
constraints are generally conflicted.
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Fig. 1. The average distance and the number of hops on two kinds of the optimal
paths in DT (triangle), RA (circle), DLSF (plus) networks. Solid lines guide the
decreasing or increasing of 〈D〉 and 〈L′〉 on the shortest paths, dashed lines guide
that of 〈D′〉 and 〈L〉 on the paths of the minimum hops.
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Fig. 2. The average distance and the number of hops on two kinds of the optimal
paths in LESF networks at A = 1 (open rectangle) and A = 3 (filled rectangle).
Solid lines guide the decreasing or increasing of 〈D〉 and 〈L′〉 on the shortest paths,
dashed lines guide that of 〈D′〉 and 〈L〉 on the paths of the minimum hops.
In the original networks without shortcuts, we note the tendencies [15]: RA
networks have a path connected by a few hops but the path length tend to be
long including some long-range links, while DT networks have a zig-zag path
connected by many hops but each link is short, in addition, DLSF networks
have the intermediately balanced properties. Figure 1 shows numerical results
in adding shortcuts to the planar networks. We find that, from the solid and
dashed lines in Figs. 1(a)(b), the average distance 〈D〉 and the number of
hops 〈L〉 become shorter as increasing the shortcut rate. In particular, the
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shortcuts are effective for the distance in RA and DLSF (solid lines marked
with circles and pluses) networks, and also for the number of hops in DTs
(dashed line marked with triangles). On another measures of 〈D′〉 and 〈L′〉, the
dashed lines for DTs (marked with triangles) and RA (with circles) networks
in Fig. 1(a) and the solid lines for RA (with circles) and DLSF (with pluses)
networks in Fig. 1(b) approach to each other. Thus, the shortcuts even around
10% decrease both 〈D〉 and 〈L〉, and maintain small 〈D′〉 and 〈L′〉. On the
other hand, as shown in Fig. 2, the average distance and the number of hops
are almost constant in LESF networks. Probably, the links emanated from
hubs already act as shortcuts on the lattice. These results are obtained from
ensembles over 100 realizations for each network model.
3.2 Robustness of connectivity
The fault tolerance and attack vulnerability are known as the typical proper-
ties of SF networks [4], which are further affected by geographical constraints.
We investigate the tolerance of connectivity in the giant component (GC) of
the geographical networks with shortcuts comparing with that of the original
ones without shortcuts. The size S of GC and the average size 〈s〉 of isolated
clusters are obtained from ensembles over 100 realizations for each network
model. Figure 3 shows the typical results that a small fraction of shortcuts
suppresses the breaking of the GC against random failures. It seems to be
enough in less than 10%. In other DLSF, LESF (A = 3) networks, the effects
are similar. Thus, the added shortcuts strengthen the tolerance in comparison
with each original network.
Figures 4 and 5 show the effect of shortcuts on the robustness against the
targeted attacks on hubs. In particular, around the shortcuts rate 10%, the
extremely vulnerable RA and DLSF networks are improved up to the similar
level to DTs. We compare the critical values of fraction fc of removed nodes at
the peak of the average size 〈s〉, as the GC is broken off. As shown in Figure
7(b), the critical values fc in RA and DLSF networks reach to 0.3 at the level of
the original DTs without shortcuts. It is consistent with the effect in evolving
networks with local preferential attachment [27] that the tolerance becomes
higher as increasing the cutoff under the same average degree 〈k〉 and size N .
We emphasize that, by adding shortcuts around 10% under almost invariant
degree distributions, the robustness against the intentional attacks can be
considerably improved up to the similar level to the fully rewired networks by
ignoring the geographical constraints [15].
The effects on LESF networks by adding shortcuts are also obtained in Fig. 6.
The case of A = 3 is more robust because of less geographical constraint with
a larger number M of the total links. Figures 7(c)(d) shows the improvement
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Fig. 3. (Color online) Typical results of the relative size S/N of the GC against
random failures in (a) DT, (b) RA, and (c) LESF (A = 1) networks at the shortcuts
rates in legend.
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Fig. 4. (Color online) Relative size S/N of the GC against intentional attacks in (a)
DT, (b) RA, and (c) DLSF networks at the shortcuts rates in legend.
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Fig. 5. (Color online) Average size 〈s〉 of isolated clusters except the GC against
intentional attacks in (a) DT, (b) RA, and (c) DLSF networks at the shortcuts rates
in legend. Inset shows the peaks enlarged by other scale of the vertical axis.
of the critical values fc; the increase is remarkable in less than the shortcuts
rate 10% as similar to Figs. 7(a)(b). These results are also obtained in the
LESF networks without the periodic boundary conditions.
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(c) 〈s〉 at A = 1
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Fig. 6. (Color online) Relative size S/N of the GC against intentional attacks in
LESF networks at (a) A = 1 and (b) A = 3. Average size 〈s〉 of isolated clusters
except the GC against intentional attacks in LESF networks at (c) A = 1 and (d)
A = 3.
3.3 Simulation for AS networks
Historically, in the 1960s, the Internet was motivated to design a self-organized
computer network with the survival capability for communication that is
highly resilient to local failures [28]. Today, it evolves to one of the world-
wide large scale systems, whose topology belongs to a SF network with a
power-law degree distribution [29]. The SF nature of the Internet exhibits
both error tolerance and attack vulnerability [4,5,6,28]. Moreover, the geo-
graphical constraints on the topological linkings [8,9] implicitly affect the ro-
bustness, indeed, the numerical study [4] has been shown more serious result
in the Internet than that in a relational SF network called Baraba´si-Albert
model without geographical constraints. For the realistic case, we examine an
improvement of the robustness against the attacks in particular, when some
shortcuts are virtually added to the Internet. We use the topology data [30]
at the level of autonomous system (AS) derived from RouteViews BGP table
snapshots by CAIDA (Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis).
Figure 8(a) shows a power-law degree distribution in the AS networks with a
few huge hubs. We also find small deviation P (k) for the shortcuts added into
8
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Fig. 7. The critical value fc of removed nodes vs. shortcut rate in (a)(b) RA, DLSF,
DT, and (c)(d) LESF networks. The piece-wise linear lines guide the increasing.
these data, however the linearity in log-log plot is almost invariant. Figures
8(b)(c) show the effect of shortcuts on the tolerance of connectivity against
the targeted attacks; the GC survives even in a double amount of attacks at
the breaking of the original networks without shortcuts, and the peak of 〈s〉 is
slightly shifted to right. The breaking around the attack rate 3% is consistent
with the previous simulations [4,5,28]. Since a smaller average degree 〈k〉 is
improper for maintaining the connectivity in spite of a small average clustering
coefficient 〈C〉 as shown in Table 1, these results may be related to a structural
vulnerability including tree-like stubs.
4 Conclusion
To improve the weakened connectivity by cycles in a theoretical prediction
[13,14], we investigate effects of shortcuts on the robustness in geographical
SF networks. Something of randomness [16,17,18,15] is expected to relax the
geographical constraints that tend to make cycles locally. Since many real
complex systems belong to SF networks [1,2] and are embedded in a metric
space [8,9], in addition, planar networks are suitable for efficient routings [22],
we consider a family of planar SF network models called RA [12,11], DT
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Fig. 8. (Color online) Results for the AS networks. (a) Degree distribution P (k).
Each mark corresponds the year/month/day. (b) Relative size S/N of the GC and
(c) the average size 〈s〉 of isolated clusters except the GC against intentional attacks
on the network in 2006. Insets shows the enlarged parts for the small fraction f .
These are similar in other two years.
[20,21], and DLSF [15], a non-planar basic geographical model called LESF
[10], and a real data of the Internet at the AS level [30] as an example for
the virtual examination. Our numerical results show that the robustness is
improved by shortcuts around 10% rate maintaining the small distance 〈D〉
and number of hops 〈L〉 on the optimal paths (with respect to the shortest and
the minimum number of hops, respectively) in each network, under similar
degree distributions to the original ones. In particular, the improvement is
remarkable in the intentional attacks on hubs. However, some cases exhibit
weak effects which depend on the values of other topological characteristics
such as 〈k〉 and 〈C〉. We will further study for comprehending the properties.
On the other hand, these results give an insight for practical constructing of
a geographical network, since the robustness can be effectively increased by
adding a small fraction of shortcuts.
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Network N M 〈k〉 〈C〉 〈L〉 P (k)
DT 1000 2993 5.986 0.441 9.02 lognormal
RA 1000 2993 5.986 0.767 4.13 power-law
DLSF 1000 2993 5.986 0.726 4.65 with cutoff
LESF
(A = 1) 1024 1831 3.576 0.342 14.5 with cutoff
(A = 3) 1024 2673 5.221 0.104 4.87 with cutoff
AS04 17509 35829 4.0926 0.234 3.77 power-law
AS05 19846 40485 4.0799 0.249 3.79 power-law
AS06 22456 45050 4.0123 0.219 3.87 power-law
Table 1
Summary of the topological characteristics: the network size N , the total number of
links M , the average degree 〈k〉, the average clustering coefficient 〈C〉, the average
path length 〈L〉 based on the minimum number of hops, and the types of degree
distribution P (k).
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Fig. 9. (Color online) Illustration of the extended routing. The (red) thick route on
the edges of (cyan) shaded faces is the shortest path ls whose distance is the same
as the dashed (red) chord of the ellipsoid. The (blue) thick route is the optimal path
including a shortcut.
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Fig. 10. (Color online) Linking procedures in a Delaunay-like SF network. The
long-range links (black solid lines in the left) are exchanged to red ones in the
shaded triangles by diagonal flips in the middle and right. The dashed lines are
new links from the barycenter, and form new five triangles with contours in the left
(The two black solid lines crossed with dashed lines are removed after the second
diagonal flip).
Appendix 1
For adding shortcuts, the efficient routing algorithm [22] on a planar network
can be extended as follows (see Figure 9) in the ellipsoid whose chord is defined
by the distance of the shortest path ls on the edges of faces that intersect the
straight line between the source and terminal as the two focuses. We describe
the outline of procedures .
• Find the shortest path ls on the original planar network without shortcuts.
• Then search shorter one including shortcuts in the ellipsoid.
• Through backtrackings from the terminal to the source in the above process,
prune the nodes that located out of the ellipsoid or on longer paths than ls
by using the positions.
We expect the additional steps for searching are not so much as visiting almost
all nodes, when the rate of shortcuts is low. Moreover, even in this case, the
robustness of connectivity can be considerably improved.
Appendix 2
The geographical networks are constructed as follows.
Planar networks [15]
Step 0: Set an initial planar triangulation on a space.
Step 1: At each time step, select a triangle at random and add a new node
at the barycenter. For each model, different linking processes are applied.
RA: Then, connect the new node to its three nodes as the subdivision of
triangle.
DLSF: Moreover, by iteratively applying diagonal flips [20], connect it to
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the nearest node within a radius defined by the distance between the new
node and the nearest node of the chosen triangle, as shown in Fig. 10.
If there is no nearest node within the radius, this flipping is skipped,
therefore the new node is connected to the three nodes.
DT: After the subdivision of the chosen triangle, diagonal flips are globally
applied to a pair of triangles until the minimum angle is not increased by
any exchange of diagonal links in a quadrilateral.
Step 2: The above process is repeated until the required size N is reached.
LESF networks [10]
Step 0: To each node on the lattice, assign a random degree k taken from
the distribution P (k) = Ck−γ, m ≤ k ≤ K, γ > 2, where C ≈ (γ − 1)mγ−1
is the normalization constant for large K.
Step 1: Select a node i at random, and connect it to its nearest neighbors
until its connectivity ki is realized, or until all nodes up to a distance r(ki) =
Ak
1/d
i have been explored: The connectivity quota kj of the target node j
is already filled in saturation. Here A > 0 is a constant.
Step 2: The above process is repeated for all nodes.
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